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Public Housing and Urban Policy:
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority
I have told my sons that they are not under any circumstances to
take part in massacres, and that news of massacres of enemies is
not to fill them with satisfaction or glee.
K. Vonnegut, SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FivE 22 (1969)
On February 10, 1969, to the great displeasure of Mayor Richard
Daley and others of the Chicago establishment, Judge Richard Austin
held that the Chicago Housing Authority had intentionally chosen
sites for family public housing with the purpose of maintaining res-
idential separation of the races in Chicago.1 The judgment order issued
five months later generally required future public housing in Chicago
to take the form of low rise, scattered site projects in white neighbor-
hoods;2 and the fervor of official reaction in both directions underlined
the seriousness with which the matter was viewed in Chicago3
Gautreaux v, Chicago Housing Authority has importance, however,
beyond the Chicago city limits. Gautreaux is the first case in which a
judgment order has been obtained against a housing authority for
discriminatory site selection, and it is already gathering progeny.4 More
1. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. 111. 1969). Mayor
Daley was reported as stating that the "ruling ... could slow up or block future public
housing construction." Chicago Tribune, March 12, 1969, at 12, col. 1.
2. Judgment Order, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, July 1, 1969. [Herein.
after cited as JUDGMENT ORDER.] See pp. 719-720 infra.
. One Commissioner of the Chicago Housing Authority claimed that the decision
"offers an historic opportunity .... What we have here is the historic opportunity to
dissolve the barriers that create the ghetto and permit the dispersion of people without
regard to race or class throughout the entire metropolis. . . . A new housing policy it
pursued with good faith and full vigor could do perhaps more than anything else to .
make people who are now fearful strangers into good neighbors," Remarks of Richard C.
Wade, Commissioner of the Chicago Housing Authority before the Chicago Housing
meeting, July 10, 1969.
Others, including Mayor Daley, supra note 1, saw the decision as one whose burden
would fall on those who depend on public housing for a place to live. Thus Congressman
Pucinski, whose l1th Congressional district would likely receive public housing under the
judgment order, decried it as "the death knell of public housing." Chicago rribune,
July 8, 1969, at 18, col. 2. For the Chicago Tribune:
The situation represents an example of what happens when federal legislation drives
at conflicting goals, runs into conflict with the desires of big city legislators to con-
form to the wishes of their constituents and courts get into the act. . . . [lit would
be highly desirable if the government could be cleared out of housing altogether.
Chicago Tribune, July 3, 1969, at 18, col. 2.
4. See Hicks v. Weaver, 802 F. Supp. 619 (ED. La. 1969), granting a preliminary Injunc.
tion against both the Bogalusa Housing Authority and the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development enjoining further construction on and payments of federal funds for
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important, the judgment order issued by the court, both by the effects
of the relief given and by the choices which underlay its provisions,
raises in stark fashion the issue of a court's proper role in making basic
policy and value choices which dictate the direction of future attempts
to deal with urban problems. It is the point of this Note to suggest that
the Gautreaux judgment order represents a short-sighted and narrow
response to the jroblem it attempts to remedy, and that such poor per-
formance is a direct result of a court's failing to recognize its own
limitations in making policy decisions.
I.
The charge before the court in Gautreaux was the intentional lim-
itation of sites for public housing5 to already black areas of Chicago
in order to maintain the pre-existing residential separation in the city.0
public housing projects whose sites were chosen for the purpose of maintaining segregation
of the races in public housing; El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners Ass'n v.
Tucson Housing Authority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (Ct. App. Div. 2, 199), holding
that the housing authority must affirmatively consider the racial character of neighbor-
hoods in choosing low income housing sites.
On October 22, 1969, a complaint was filed with the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development charging the Housing Authority of Charlotte, North Carolina, with using
public housing site selection to maintain residential segregation in Charlotte. It is ex-
pected that a suit will be filed in early 1970 listing the Housing Authority and HUD as
defendants and seeking, similar to Gautreaux, scattered site public housing in the white
areas of the city. Letter from James E. Lanning, Counsel for Plaintiff, Nov. 4, 1969. Letter
and copy of complaint on file with Yale Law Journal.
5. For purposes of the Note, a simplified understanding of the federal housing pro-
gram is sufficient. Pursuant to state enabling legislation a city first creates a local housing
authority. After submission of a planned project, and its approval by MUD, an annual
contributions contract is executed by which HUD, through annual grants, agrees to
finance the capital costs of the project. Operational and maintenance expenses remain
the city's obligation to be covered out of rent. More recently, other federal housing pro-
gram models have been attempted. See note 51 infra.
6. This result, the maintenance of residential segregation, is simply the other side of
the more commonly recognized result of "selective" selection, the maintenance of racial
uniformity within housing projects. If a project is built in a non-white area, it will very
likely house predominantly non-white tenants. See, e.g., Ledbetter, Public Hounsg-A
Sodal Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 LAw & CoNTE.tiP. PRoD. 490, 503 (1967). The
complaint in Hicks v. -Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969), was based on this
latter effect.
For a number of reasons this Note will treat the problem as one of using public housing
to maintain residential segregation. Future policy will be concerned with public housing
not only as an end in itself, but also as a means to solve more comprehensive urban
problems. See, eg., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvisoRy CosnmssoON CIVIL DISonarns
474-81 (Bantam ed. 1968); RnPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S Cou.svrrrEr oN Un,.i:; HOuSING, A
Dzrr HossE 48 (1968). Furthermore, to the extent one's concern is solely with the racial
composition of the project itself, it can be argued that remedies may be limited to
compulsory tenant assignment of whites to suc projects. Passing the point of w'edither
such a policy is e ffective or desirable, see e.g., Ledbetter, Public Housing: A Social
Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 w & CoTEt?. pson. 490, 523 (1967); only the more
comprehensive statement of the problem, maintenance of residential sgregation, can
explain remedies such as those prescribed by the court in Gautreaux. Finally, it woud
be conceptually erroneous to describe the motivation for dsciminatory stc selecon (at
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Had sites not been so limited and had tenants been assigned on a non-
discriminatory basis, placing public housing in white neighborhoods
would have resulted in placing blacks in white neighborhoods.
Through the exercise of its veto power over site selection,7 the Chicago
City Council had limited project sites to ghetto neighborhoods. 8 Thus,
in Gautreaux there was no difficulty proving the underlying Four-
teenth Amendment violation such placement would create. The court
found a direct intent to maintain racial separation.0
least in northern cities) as being an abstract revulsion at the thought of black aid whit
living together in public housing. The more accurate description Is that middle class
whites do not want blacks and hence do not want public housing in their neighborhoods,
even if that means that low-income whites who require public housing will be forced to
live in black neighborhoods. See note 8 infra.
7. In some states the requirement of local approval of the site is explicit, either by
direct referendum on the particular project as in California (CAL. CONST. art. 84), or by
City Council approval, as in Chicago:
If the area of operation of a housing authority includes a city, village or incorporated
town having a population in excess of 500,000 . . . no real property or Interest In
real property shall be acquired by the housing authority until such time as . . .
the governing body of the municipality has approved the acquisition by the housing
authority.
ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 671, § 9 (West, 1959). See also Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 293 F. Snpp.
301 (W.D. Mich. 1969) (enjoining of racially motivated referendum to deny zoning varl.
ance to low rent housing project in a white neighborhood), reversed on appeal Ranjel v.
City of Lansing, per curiam 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969). Even where such explicit au-
thority is lacking, local governments can still retain a site veto, either through allowing
the Workable Program required by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1410(s), 24 CFR § 200.15, to lapse, or
by insisting on a prior veto as a condition to the execution of the cooperation contract
required from the local governmental body by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1415(7)(b). Interview with
Kathryn Kula, General Counsel, Chicago Housing Authority, in Chicago, November 6,
1969. [Hereinafter cited as Kula Interview.]
8. Ninety-nine and a half per cent of the family units operated by CHA were In
neighborhoods between 50 and 100 per cent black. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Au-
thority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 910 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The effect of this has been to limit interest
in public housing to blacks, who comprise 90 per cent of the current eligibility list. Id. at
909. The fact that this exclusion of 188,000 otherwise eligible white families (id. at 915)
has been willingly borne, even by those excluded, indicates the extent of the fear of
placing public housing in white neighborhoods.
9. Some historical background of public housing and the site selection process In
Chicago may prove useful. The controversy over the racial implications of site selections
is as old as public housing itself, see e.g., Cooke, Housing Site Problems-A Review of
the Site Selection Experiences of 12 Cities since 1949, 12 JoURNAL or HousINo 48 (1952),
though early Chicago projects avoided such implications since Brown v. Board of E duca-
tion, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), had not been decided and segregation was still lawful In public
housing. See e.g., Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Comment, Thi
Public Housing Administration and Discrimination in Federally Assisted Low 1ent
Housing, 64 MICH. L. .,v. 871, 875 n.30, 876 n.33 (1966) (collecting preBrown cases both
approving and disapproving segregated public housing). See also Cohen v. Public Housing
Administration, 257 F.2d 73, 74 n.5 (5th Cir. 1958).
Things began to change in 1946 when CHA was authorized to provide temporary
housing for veterans. Since this housing was needed quickly, it had to be built on vacant,
therefore generally white land, and since 20 per cent of the veterans were black, by
necessity some blacks would be located in white neighborhoods. BANrIELD & MLYRS'ON,
POLrICS, PLANNING & THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 121-30 (1955). [Hereinafter cited as BANFIr &
MEYERSON.] The racial issue was explicitly raised by aldermen in whose wards the Inte.
grated projects were to be located.
The burning question is whether or not Negro veterans are to be located it this
project. . . . I believe, Miss Wood [executive secretary of CHA], that, considering
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Having decided the merits, the court faced the more difficult prob-
lem of fashioning a remedy. In simplest terms, the Gautreaux court
required that the next 700 units of public housing plus 75 per cent of
all units built thereafter were to be built in white neighborhoods. It is
with the choice of this remedy that difficulties arise.10
In order to evaluate the Gautreaux remedy, a general constitutional
principle for remedying intentional discrimination would be useful.
Although no such generally applicable principle appears in the cases,
such a formulation is possible: the remedy must prohibit future dis-
the fact that there are other projects now 100 per cent colored, you could go down
the list of 25,000 veteran applicants and, without bothering your conscience a bit,
find 87 white tenants for the local project.
Statement of Alderman DuBois, Calumet Index, May 19, 1947, quoted in B.'rzew &
MEYERSON at 126-27.
As the passage of the Housing Act of 1949 became probable, the City Council feared
that having once authorized the cooperation contract necessary to obtain any federal
housing at all, sole site selection power would rest with a housing authority v.hose values
the City Council did not share. The result was the passage of state legislation requiring
local government approval of any acquisition of property by a housing authority. Ia.
REv. STAT. ch. 675 § 9, quoted in pertinent part note 7 stpra.
The 1949 selection battle that followed was to set the course of future site selection in
Chicago. CHA's initial package of seven sites was almost equally divided between slum
and vacant sites; of these, only two slum sites were accepted by the Council Housing
Committee. BANFIELD & MEYERSON at 170, 186. The compromise, which was finally accepted
by the City Council better than a year later, called for 10,500 units on slum sites and
2,000 units on vacant, not many of which were white. Id. at 199.
The effect of the 1949 result and subsequent excision of white sites from both the 1955
and 1956 programs was to convince CHA that the City Council had no intention of
approving white sites. From this point CHA conceived its primary responsibility as
insuring that badly needed public housing was built, even if only in the ghettos. Out of
this conclusion arose the pre-clearance procedure on which plaintiff relied heavily to prove
discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Initial Brief for Plaintiff at 6-9, 19, 42; Reply Brief for
Plaintiff at 50.
The point of the pre-clearance procedure was to obtain prior approval from the alder-
man in whose ward a proposed site was to be located. The memorandum which created
the procedure makes this dear.
The Legislature has vested in the City Council the final power to approve by ordi-
nance the specific sites on which public housing may be constructed. The power to
approve includes the power to disapprove.
The subcommittee would thus have an opportunity to dear with Aldermen of the
Wards in which proposed sites are located, to determine community characteristics
and attitudes which should be recognized in site selection.
Pre-Clearance Memo at 2. (Emphasis added. The memorandum of the Executive Director
of CHA setting up the procedure is attached as an appendix to Reply Brief for Defendant,
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority.) It was under this structure that the 10,903
units on white sites initially submitted by CHA in their 1955, 1956, 1958, 1965 and 1966
programs were eliminated.
The point of the preceding discussion, in addition to providing some factual back-
ground, is to make dear that the court's decision was not premised on "racist" behavior
by CHA. The clear discrimination was on the part of the City Council, who was not
joined as a party to the action. Judge Austin held that "even if CHA had not participated
in the elimination of white sites," in view of the course being followed by the City
Council, CHA's only alternative consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment was not to
build public housing at all. Gantreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907,
914 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
10. For an interesting treatment of the substantive equal protection issue, see Com-
ment, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1172 (1969).
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crimination and relieve the continuing effects of past discrimination.
Merely to forbid further discrimination is a sufficient remedy in those
situations where integration will be self-effecting. With public parks
and drinking fountains, for example, equal access is assured merely by
removing the legal restraint. The general remedy standard indicates
that the Constitution does not require integration; rather it requires
the removal of restrictions on integration. The school cases appear
otherwise because, in the context of the schools, separate education
has been found factually unequal." Given that finding, the continuing
effects of past discrimination, i.e. unequal education, remain until
actual integration takes place. The relationship between non-discrim-
ination and integration is not tautological. The remedy for intentional
discrimination in most situations is not actual integration, but the
freedom to integrate if one so desires.
The need for a general formulation goes beyond a simple legal af.
finity for precision and consistency. As cases like Gautreaux begin
to present remedial situations even more complex than those faced
in the schools, continued emphasis on actual integration as a standard
limits the freedom of courts and agencies fully to remedy the contin-
uing effects of past discrimination. A full remedy need not provide
immediate actual integration. Such a decision is a matter of policy,
not constitutional law; to formulate a general remedial standard which
would imply the elevation of one policy choice to the level of consti-
tutional principle would tie the hands of courts and other institutions
attempting to deal creatively with intricate social problems.
The remedial purpose applied by the court in Gautreaux, "to pro-
hibit the future use and to remedy the past effects of CHA's unconsti-
tutional site selection,' 2 is sufficiently similar to the general principle
constructed here that the choice of a remedy satisfying the former
would satisfy the latter as well.'3 The court has found an intentional
11. A catch phrase from the school cases, an affirmative duty to bring about actual
integration, is thus an unsatisfactory statement of the general rcquirement. See, e.g,,
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, aff'd en bane 380
F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied sub. nom. Caldo Parish School Board v. United
States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967). Such a standard may also have been at the base of the
Supreme Court's rejection of the freedom of choice plans. See Green v. County School
Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Mionroe v.
Board of Commr's, 391 US. 450 (1068).
12. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 007, 914, JUDGMENT OtWra
at 1,
13. Here the difference is perhaps only one of precision. To remedy a past discrlinina.
dion, which does not have a continuing effect on present conditions, would perhaps
require some sort of individual money damages. As yet, however, courts have been Con.
cerned only with present effects, correctable through the equitable powers of the court,
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use of public housing to maintain residential segregation, through the
building of public housing only in black neighborhoods. As a conse-
quence blacks were denied the opportunity to choose to live in public
housing in white neighborhoods. The continuing effect of CHA's dis-
crimination is the continuing unavailability of such a choice. The
constitutional duty to eliminate that effect requires the use of public
housing to provide an effective opportunity for residential integration.
The more difficult question that obviously remains-how one uses
public housing for this purpose-is a policy question, not a con-
stitutional one. It asks how, in practical terms, public housing should
be used to provide a ghetto resident with an effective opportunity to
live elsewhere.
Although some commentators have maintained that we lack suf-
ficient information to frame workable solutions, 4 there are at least
two distinct, though not mutually exclusive, policy positions regarding
the most effective use of public housing to provide opportunities for
residential integration. The first is the more obvious, and reflects the
conventional wisdom of remedial action in civil rights litigation: in-
tegrate in the most direct manner possible. In the context of Gau-
treaux, the "integration ethic" directs here the placement of public
housing in white neighborhoods to provide black residents with the
choice that had been earlier denied them.15
There is, however, a second position, purposefully less direct, but
One who, having gone to and graduated from a segregated school, has no personal remedy
for an injury to him that is no longer within the court's power to cure.
14. See Grier, The Negro Ghetto and Federal Housing Policy, 32 LAw & Co=rn'.
PRoB. 550, 560 (1967); see also D. HuNTEi, ThE SLIMS 238 (1963).
15. This position has received considerable support in recent governmental advisory
committee reports. See REPorT OF THE NATIONAL ADVisoRY Co.MISSION ON CtvtL DonrVEs
(Bantam ed. 1968).
Federal housing programs must be given a new thrust aimed at overcoming the pre-
vailing pattern of radal segregation. If this is not done, those programs will continue
to concentrate the most impoverished and dependent segments of the population in
the central cities....
rd. at 474.
To date, however, housing programs serving low income groups have been concen-
trated in the ghettos. Non-ghetto areas, particularly suburbs, for the mo!t part have
steadfastly opposed ... and have successfully resisted the use of these programs
outside the ghetto.
We believe that federally aided low and moderate housing programs must be re-
oriented so that the major thrust is in non-ghetto areas....
Id. at 481. A more extensive treatment of the premises underlying the Nauional Advisory
Committee's position is found in Anthony Downs, Alternative Futures for the American
Ghetto, 97 D.mmALus 1331 (1968). See also PaRsiDEr's CoMIrrTE ON URDA; HOUSING, A
DF=E C HomE 13, 48 (1968).
For non-official sources taking a similar position, see, e.g., NAToNAL Cownrrrr Ac M~r
D sCRnuNAToN iN HOuSING, How rTu FmmRMAL Govn.aumNr Bruows Gun-sos (1967);
J. KAIN & J. PmPEY, Alternatives to the Gilded Ghetto, in .ACz & PovE=R 167 (J. Kin
e. 1969).
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still persuasive. It bottoms in the premise that in order for the oppor-
tunity for integration to be effective, the merging parties must be equal
in fact as well as in law. One provides alternatives to the ghetto by
developing it and the people within it. Freedom to integrate will fol-
low as a matter of course. This is admittedly more indirect, but, it is
argued, the foundation is stronger. Such a position was taken by the
late Senator Robert F. Kennedy in testifying before the Senate Sub-
committee on Housing and Urban Affairs. In urging the placement of
the great majority of new housing in the ghetto, he went on to say:
To seek a rebuilding of our urban slums is not to turn our
backs on the goal of integration. It is only to say that open oc-
cupancy laws alone will not suffice and that sensitivity must be
shown to the aspirations of Negroes and other non-whites who
would build their own communities and occupy decent housing
in neighborhoods where they now live. And, in the long run, this
willingness to come to grips with blight of our center city will lead
us toward an open society. For it is comparability of housing and
full employment that are the keys to free movement and to the
establishment of a society in which each man has a real opportun-
ity to choose whom he will call neighbor.1 6
Put another way, social equality can be seen as a function of political
equality. Where the political process is best characterized as the work-
ing out of conflicting group interests, and representation in that process
is often geographical, the development of the ghetto provides for the
political representation of a group with particular goals and concerns
and provides the basis for the equality necessary for a free choice of
residence.17
The court in Gautreaux did resolve this policy debate, and both the
direction of its resolution and the skill such resolution displays cast
16. Hearings on S. 3029 Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of tho
Senate Banking and Currency Committee, 90th Congress, 2nd Session (1968). It Is itter.
esting that the percentages suggested by Senator Kennedy, 75 per cent ghetto, 25 per
cent non-ghetto, id. are the mirror image of those in the Gautreaux judgment order.
See intfra p. 719. See also Robert F. Kennedy, Industrial Investment in Urban Poverty,
in RACE & PovERTY 153, 157 U. Kain ed. 1969) (reprinted from a Senate speech of
Jul 12, 1967).
17. The Achilles heel of housing programs has been precisely our insistence that
better housing for the black poor be achieved by residential desegregation. This Idea
glosses over the importance of the ethnic community as a staging area for groups to
build the communal solidarity and power necessary to compel eventual access to the
mainstream of urban life.
Piven and Cloward, Desegregated Housing: Who Pays for the Reformers Ideas, in RACE
AND POVERTY 175, 181-82 (J. Kain ed. 1969). See also D. HUTErra TnE SLUMS vi-vli (1968);
R. Innis, Separatist Economics: A New Social Contract in BLACK ECONOttIC DEVELOIENT
50 (W. Haddad & G. Pugh eds. 1969); S. CARMIlCHAEL & C. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER
54-56 (1967); H. CRUsE, THE CIsIs OF TME NEcRo INTECrTuAL 309 (1967); Slayton, A
Racial Policy for Housing Growth, The N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1969, Sec. 8, at 1, col. I
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doubts on the wisdom of having courts, in preference to other institu-
tions, so decide.
The judgment order drawn in Gautreaux initially divided the city
into two sections: a "Limited Public Housing Area" defined to include
all census tracts "having 30 per cent or more non-white population, or
within a distance of one mile from any point on the outer perimeter of
any such census tract"; and a "General Public Housing Area" which
is the remainder of the city."8 The order then prohibits CHA from
constructing any other dwelling units until not less than 700 units are
in the process of construction in the General Public Housing Area.21
Further, no construction of units can take place within the Limited
Public Housing Area at all unless 75 per cent of the units begun after
the initial 700 are within the General Public Housing Area.2 0 In short,
the next 700 units and 75 per cent of all units thereafter have to be
located in white neighborhoods.
The judgment order next regulates CHA's use of the federal leased
housing program under which local authorities may lease units in
private buildings for use by families eligible for low-rent public hous-
ing.21 The order provides that CHA may make no unit available for
occupancy in the Limited Public Housing Area unless, at that time, 75
per cent of then occupied leased units are in the General Public
Housing Area.2
The order then prescribes in detail the type of housing that can be
18. JuDGm-r OmE id. at 2. The order does make technical allowance for the place-
ment of !/q of the units required for the General Public Housing Area in areas of Cook
County outside the City of Chicago. JuDMEr ORmE III C & E. However, this provision
has no practical effect. It wvas inserted in the order at the insistence of CHA, who, having
such authority under state law, feared that the order might at some time be read as an
exclusive statement of their site selection discretion and therefore wanted the order to
run coextensive with their statutory grant. Kula Interview.
Of the total dty area of 200 square miles, the General Public Housing Area would
cover 75 square miles and the Limited Public Housing Area 125 square miles. The scope
of this division is revealed by considering the status under the order of the 10,.903
"'white" units rejected over the I-ears by the City Council. See note 9 supra. Of these,
only 775, less than 10 per cent, would fall within the General Public Housing Area
under the order and hence be currently developable by the CHA. Memorandum for the
United States at 4 ( vague statement of the position of the government, particularly the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, on the question of remedy). The
number may, however, be significantly fewer. If, as was likely at the time they were
proposed, those 775 units on sites still acceptable were slated for relatively large projects,
then the number of units such sites could now support would be many fewer under lhe
order's limit of 20 units (120 people) per project. See note 23 infra.
19. JuDGmmT OmE, IIB at 4.
20. Id. IIIC at 4.
21. 42 U.S.C.A. 1421b.
22. JLDGMNT ORDER HID at 4-5. The 75 per cent requirement here may be reduced
to the extent that construction of new units in the General Public Housing Area exceeds
75 per cent of total construction.
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constructed or leased. These provisions, limiting the size and concen-
tration of future projects, 23 are apparently designed to assure stable
integration of the new housing into the larger white community.
24
Jurisdiction was retained by the court for the purpose of modifying
the judgment order, a procedure which has since been invoked four
times on minor points.
The order, by tying the provision of housing in black neighborhoods
to that in white, reflects a preference for the "integration ethic" alone.
However, even setting aside the argument that ghetto development
itself is the best means to achieve eventual integration, the fact re-
mains that large numbers of people prefer to live in an ethnic com-
munity we call a ghetto, and that public housing can be one means to
make that community a better place to live. Not only does the judg-
ment order make that use impossible until the initial 700 units are
built, but, because of interplay among various statutory provisions, the
order also makes more difficult the use of other federal programs de-
signed explicitly for ghetto development.
An obvious example of this removal of opportunity is the effect of
the judgment order on the leased housing program. A major cause of
the decline in quality of ghetto low-income housing stock is that land-
lords cannot afford to maintain a building at rents low-income people
can afford to pay. In such a situation, a leasing system which provides
the private landlord with a reasonable rent helps to forestall otherwise
inevitable decay.25 Yet, in practical terms, the order's requirement that
23. The order specifically provides that no project can be designed for occupancy by
more than 120 people, though providing an impossibility exception which, if the appli-
cation of the exception "will assist in achieving the purposes of this judgment order,"
raises thelimit to 240 people, JUDGMENT ORDER IVA at 5-6. Given CHA's present estimate
of 6 people to family, projects may contain no more than 20 units. Kula Interview.
Projects may also not be so concentrated as to constitute more than fifteen per cent of
the total apartments and single family residences in any census tract. JuDoarntr ORDR
IVC at 6. Finally, no families with children may be placed in an apartment any higher
than the third story, the obvious result being that no family public housing may exceed
three stories. Id,
24. Limiting the size and concentration of projects reflects a concern articulated by
Anthony Downs: "A vast majority of whites of all income groups would be willn to
send their children to integrated schools or live in integrated neighborhoods, as log
as they were sure that the white group concerned would remain in the majoriiy In thol
facilities or areas." Alternative Futures for the American Ghetto, 97 DAEDALus 1331, 188
(1968) (emphasis in the original). From the other side, a small project, because it would
not be socially self-sufficient, assures that its residents will make use of community facli
ities. Related to this is the 15 per cent concentration limit. The limit on the number of
stories seems to reflect an idea that low-rise garden type apartments are more likely to
fit within the available site neighborhood as Well as a belief that it is difficult to ralge
small children in elevator buildings.
25. Indeed, one of Congress' stated purposes was "the effect of broadened use of privately
owned structures in 'gray' areas and where such use could encourage the conservation and
improvements of residential properties." H. R. REP. No. 865, REPORT ON T rE HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT Aar OF 1965, 89th Cong., 1st Session (1965).
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75 per cent of leased units be in the General Public Housing Area
will gat the program.
Ninety per cent of the families eligible for the leasing program are
black,2 6 and the participation of a sufficient number of landlords in
white neighborhoods is improbable. A lessor who rents 20 per cent of
his building to low-income blacks27 is unlikely, given the current
market, to be able to rent the remaining 80 per cent. Since the vacancy
rate in white neighborhoods is so low, he need not take the chance.
The situation is markedly different, however, in ghetto neighbor-
hoods, where landlords are eager to use the leasing program. The judg-
ment order's limitation of units leased in black neighborhoods to one-
third of those leased in white neighborhoods, when coupled with the
unlikelihood that leasing will be successfully used in white neighbor-
hoods, will doom the entire program. Because the end result of the
court's interference with the leasing program is to make it unusable
by blacks, without any countervailing benefit for whites, the order
should not have covered the leasing program; indeed, nothing in the
charge before the court required it to deal with the leasing program
at all.
The order also has significant impact on the future use of urban
renewal. The "Proxmire Amendment," contained in the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968, requires that 20 per cent of any
new housing built in urban renewal projects must be for low income
families.2 8 Assuming urban renewal will generally take place within
the 62V per cent of the city's area represented by the Limited Public
Housing Area,2 9 public housing could be built on urban renewal land
only after both the initial 700 units required by the order were com-
pleted, and enough additional units in the General Public Housing
Area were commenced to create a 75-25 ratio of housing constructed
after the first 700 units.
Looking beyond that point, however, the order will continue to
make beneficial use of urban renewal difficult, if not in practical terms
impossible. Urban renewal has been consistently criticized as being in
fact "Negro removal," replacing low income housing with luxury
apartments and commercial structures. One response was the "Prox-
26. Gautreaux v. Cdicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. IMI. 1969).
27. By federal statute CHA may lease only 10 per cent of the building's units, but
the statute also allows the Authority to rednd the limit if deemed necessary. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1421(c). Twenty per cent is a hypothetical figure chosen because it represents FHA's
previous limit on the Authority's participation in 221(d)( ) projects. Kula Interview.
28. 42 U.S.CA. § 1455(0.
29. See note 18 supra.
721
The Yale Law Journal
mire Amendment," which gave a new "ghetto development" thrust to
the urban renewal program. Yet, the effect of the judgment order is
to blunt that thrust, for it sets as a prior condition for the construction
of each low-income housing unit on an urban renewal site within the
Limited Public Housing Area the construction of three units in the
General Public Housing Area.30
The Model Cities Program,3 1 a program specifically designed for
neighborhood development, also suffers from the judgment order's 3
to 1 requirement. Of the four model neighborhoods in Chicago, three
are within the Limited Public Housing Area. Current proposals for
these model neighborhoods provide for the building of 1950 units of
family public housing.32 Under the Gautreaux order, 5850 units (00 to
1) must be built in the General Public Housing Area before the
planned housing can be provided within the model neighborhoods.
Such a restraint is directly contrary to the rationale for the Model
Cities Act.
These effects on ghetto development were not oversights, but were
indeed recognized in the drawing of the judgment order. Plaintiff's
counsel characterized them as "simply the price one is forced to pay."t8 3
Ghetto residents are familiar, however, with price gouging. Why should
the provision of public housing in white neighborhoods in order to
promote residential integration have been thought to be at cross pur-
poses with simultaneous programs for ghetto development?"4 Indeed,
30. The judgment order has similar impact on another urban rencwal statute which
was not yet out of committee at the time the order was issued. Section 210 of the
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, P.L. 91-152, 83 Stat. 379 (Dec. 24, 1969),
requires that any housing demolished by urban renewal be replaced by an equivalent
number of units of low and moderate income housing within the total area over which
the local authority has jurisdiction. Assume then a project which will require the de.
struction and consequent replacement of 1000 low income units. Assuming no purplus
in the General Public Housing Area, such replacement units would be required by the
judgment order to be distributed 750 General, 250 Limited. Thus, urban renewal, when
acting as limited by the judgment order, would seem to again be requiring "Negro
removal." People would again be forced to move out of their neighborhood.
31. 80 Stat. 1255 (1966). For a discussion of the Model Cities program see Hetzel and
Pinsky, The Model Cities Program, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 727 (1969).
32. Memorandum for United States at 11.
33. Telephone interview with Alexander Polikoff, Attorney for Plaintiffs, Nov. 24,
1969. As will be indicated on p. 726 infra, the Judgment Order adopted by the Court was,
with two exceptions, that drafted by the Plaintiffs. The problems discussed in the text
were also reflected, though with some lack of vigor, in the Memorandum for the United
States, note 18 supra. This memorandum, however, was apparently submitted so late In
the course of hearings on the order as to be of no value. It was the recollection of
CHA's General Counsel that the memo was not delivered to Judge Austin until 6:00 P.M.
on June 30, when the order was scheduled to come down on July 1. Kula Interview.
34. Cf. Marie Antoinette: "Let them eat Gautreaux." Not only may both alternatives
be pursued at the same time, but ghetto development can in itself be seen as a means
toward residential integration. See p. 718 supra.
One cannot ignore, however, the single argument supporting the judgment order's
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an additional factor, the new tenant assignment plan,35 by acting to
slow the order's primary thrust of moving blacks into white neigh-
borhoods, would seem to make concurrent ghetto development even
more important. While blacks on the waiting list will retain their
priority over those registering later, an additional priority is created
before them: fifty per cent of the units available in the new projects
both at initial offering and as vacancies occur are reserved for ap-
plicants who reside in the community area in which the project is
located. The point of the community priority provision, apparently, is
to ensure that the individual projects themselves will be integrated.
The effect of it is to reduce significantly the number of new units which
will be available for blacks.38
The quality of the order, its lack of concern for parallel values, raises
the question of the proper role of a court in making the kinds of de-
cisions the judgment order represents.
II.
When the suggestion is made here that the Gautreaux court over-
stepped its proper limitations, it is not meant to raise a question con-
cerning the legitimacy of the court's action, the legitimate exercise of
"the power to apply and construe the Constitution, in matters of the
greatest moment, against the wishes of a legislative majority, which is,
in turn, powerless to affect the judicial decision."37
outcome. Unless something is held out in front of the dty-the proverbial carrot and
the donkey-it will simply not build housing in white neighborhoods and go on, as
before, developing the ghetto. Yet, on this reasoning, one would conclude that the most
effective order would be that offering the biggest carrot. Make the availability of the
most desirable housing from the City's point of view-housing for the elderly-tum on
the provision of family public housing in white neighborhoods. In addition, this would
not affect simultaneous ghetto development.
35. The plan was approved by Judge Austin on November 24. 1969.
$6. The possibility does remain that the City Council will still refuse to approve
white sites, and thus eliminate public housing completely. While the thought of jailing
the entire City Council for contempt has its appeal, such drastic action might not be
necessary, however. One alternative would eliminate the necessity of Council approval by
finding the Illinois statute giving the Council the right of approval unconstitutional as
applied. While this would in fact take political pressure off the City Council by no
longer placing them in the position of having to go on record as approving particular
white sites, it does not tie their hands if they are indeed bent on obstruction. They may
still refuse to authorize the annual contributions necessary for participation in federal
programs. See note 7 supra. In the event of such outright obstruction in the north,
resort to the southern school dosing cases would seem appropriate, e.g., Griffin v. County
School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 US. 218. And, as first stated, there is
civil contempt.
37. A. Escx-, ThE LEAsr DANGaEous BRANcH 20 (1952). Professor Bickel is there
defining judicial review. The use in the text broadens the definition to include the
court's overruling of the deliberate non-action of a legislative majority.
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In Gautreaux, there is no question that the court legitimately de-
cided the merits of the substantive question presented by the parties;
here the court was acting in its traditional role as a court of general
jurisdiction, that is, as the "primary agency for the peaceful settlement
of disputes .... ,38 A court has found a clear violation under current
lawO and the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy. But, having resolved the
controversy brought to it by the parties, the fortuity that in drawing
38. Id. at 173.
39. A recent comment on Gautreaux has strongly criticized the decision for predicating
its finding of a violation upon a showing of intent and thereby refusing to adopt a more
expansive approach to the equal protection clause. Note, Gautreaux v. Public Housing
Authority: Equal Protection and Public Housing, 118 U. PA, L. DR~v, 437 (1970). "This
type of adverse effect upon a disadvantaged group is a violatiort of equal protection as
developed by Hobsen and Norwalk, whether or not it was the purpose of CHA to achieve
it." Id. at 442. The implications of such a position, however, seem rather strange. Assume
a situation where there is no real lack of low-income housing (though there Is private
residential segregation) and a city has decided that the quality of the stock it black
neighborhoods could use improvement. In response, the city begins urban renewal In
these areas, replacing the older housing with public housing of good design. Is It the
position of the Pennsylvania Law Review Note that such a program has an "adverse
effect" upon a disadvantaged group, i.e., the black neighborhood, because housing was
built in the neighborhood, rather than somewhere else? To the extent the Note sug.
gests that it is unconstitutional for a city to solve one of its urban problems, if it does
not simultaneously solve all others, it is too simple. While a court must provide a
remedy to restore choice, p, 716 supra, a legislature or administrative agency acting
on a policy problem is not so bound. Perhaps,. however, the author merely suggests lis
own view of policy: which problem he thinks the city ought to solve first, what type Of
society he wants. It remains unclear, however, why a district court, in the course of deter.
mining the existence of a constitutional violation, is entitled to elevate this commentator's
policy view to the level of constitutional law. It is the point of the intent requirement to
avoid this outcome.
This is not to say that what led the Pennsylvania Note to take the position It did, a
fear that the burden of intent will simply be too heavy for plaintiffs in most situations,
is misplaced. In fact, Gautreaux was an anomaly in that it was only CHA's failure to
discriminate, its insistence on presenting to the City Council sites selected solely on the bais
of suitability for public housing, which made obvious the discriminatory intent of the City
Council. Yet some measure of relief can be provided without the disabilities which attend
the Pennsylvania solution. For example, in jury discrimination cases, e.g, Hernandez V.
Texas, 374 U.S. 475 (1954); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967), and in school cases,
e.g., Chambers v. Henderson City Board of Education, 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 196 ):
United States v. School District 151, 286 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. I11. 1968), affirmcd, 404 V,2d
1125 (7th Cir. 1968); Evans v. Buchanan, 207 F. Supp. 820 (D. Del. 1962), the evidentlary
burden was eased by allowing proof of separation to create a presumption of Intent,
and public housing cases following Gautreaux seem to prefer this approach to solving
evidentiary problems by tinkering with the Constitution.
,The principle that location is highly relevant to non-discrimination in public pro-
grams has been recognized by the Fifth Circuit in the analogous area of school
construction. That same principle must be applicable to public housing. It would,
in fact, be totally unrealistic to say that the location o( public housing is not relevant
to the issue of discrimination. This does not mean that the location of public housing
in all-Negro neighborhoods is per se a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d). But it doescreate a strong inference which, if unexplained, may be sufficient to support the
conclusion. - , . [Tjhe fact that sites are located in Negro areas is certainly a prime
factor to consider in determining whether discrimination exists.
Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619, 622-23 (E.D. La. 1969) (citations omitted). Sac also
El Cortez Heights Residents and Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson Housing Authority, 10
Ariz, App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (Ct. App. Div. 2, 1969):
We do not hold that the selection per se was illegal, but only that the racial
character of the neighborhood cannot be ignored in choosing a low income housing
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a remedy the court must resolve a major issue of policy does not make
the court a housing expert, nor an urbanologist with technical grasp
of the many and conflicting problems facing a major city. Furthermore
no single lower court can be an effective planner, for it cannot assure
that its policy choice at the remedial level will be accepted by other
courts or institutions that face policy choices in areas separate from
but intertwined with the question before the court.40 An awareness of
these limitations is particularly important in cases like Gautreaux
which, even on remedy, implicitly involve legal institutions in a major,
unresolved problem of the country's future-the question of whether
the society will be one where groups retain their identities or one
where the goal is assimilation of its peoples.4 Although in confronting
this problem questions about judicial "legitimacy" might of course
be raised, the surer question in a case like Gautreaux concerns a court's
competency to direct a solution, even where it is operating within its
traditional and legitimate role. Thus, what is questioned is the court's
competency to make the policy choices necessary to frame and admin-
ister that remedy. 2
site. The Authority should, however, note that placement of public housing in a
Negro Community creates strong doubts as to its acceptability.
10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294, 297.
40. Consider, for example, a situation where suit is brought by residents of an ur-
ban renewal site within the Limited Public Housing Area charging a violation of
105(c); more specifically charging that relocation opportunities are inadequate because of
failure to provide sufficient public housing within the project itself. Cf. Western Addition
Community Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Calif. 1968). A possible remedy
would be an order requiring construction of public housing within the project. Yet
such an order, in combination with the Gautreaux order, would require the provision
of 3 times that number of units in white neighborhoods, without any consideration of
the necessity of those units. Carried one step further, if the urban renewal order followed
Gautreaux's lead in providing an incentive for compliance by tying the provision of
housing elsewhere to compliance with the order, we would be left with the absurd result of
being unable to satisfy the urban renewal order because of the Gautreaux order and
unable to satisfy the Gautreaux order because of the urban renewal order.
Such a process of policy formation has been justifiably criticized. "Decision-making
concerning domestic issues is too fragmented and diffused to permit the formulation of
any long-range plan regarding a given problem .... Each decision-maker . . .makes
whatever choices seem to him most appropriate at that moment, in light of his o'n
interests and his own view of the public welfare." Downs, Alternatite Futures for the
American Ghetto, 97 DADA.us 1331, 1341 (1968). See also A. Bicmm, TuE SurnEm!E
CoUsr AND THE IDEA OF PROGR.SS 175 (1970).
41. Either we accept without further delusions that America is pluralistic and
democratically adjiqst our economic, political, cultural and administrative institu-
tions to fit what is th human, living fact and cease believing in the m)thology of
assimilated Americanism based on the dominant, white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon
ideal, or the racial crisis will be more and more exacerbated. This would be the
approach to an evolutionary path for social change in America.
H. CgE, REBELLioN AD REVOLUrION 105-06 (Apollo ed. 1969).
42. It was to this point that Judge Hay's dissent in Nonalk Core v. Nonalk Re-
development Agency, 395 F-2d 920, 938 (2nd Cir. 1968), was aimed. ("The Federal Courts
cannot gdminister the housing Act.') Of course, this need not be the case. If the issue
were framed as whether non-federal urban projects, absent the requirement of 105(c),
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Yet having found a violation the court must act to remedy the con-
tinuing effects of past discrimination. The dilemma is to find a means
of performing the task while staying within the limits of its own insti-
tutional competence. The court must, if at all possible, avoid making
the policy decision here itself. A judge should, rather, follow or force
such resolution by one having the requisite expertise. The Gautreauv.
court, in fact, did all but delegate the policy decision to another party,
but hardly in an exemplary manner: the Gautreaux judgment order
was determined, with two exceptions,43 by plaintiff's attorneys who ad-
mitted having no previous housing experience and yet failed to consult
anyone who did.
44
Here a solution to the competency dilemma would have been the
court's deferring to HUD, the expert agency in the field of housing
and urban development. A perusal of the statutes and HUD regula.
tions46 would have indicated that HUD had already decided the policy
decision facing the court.46 HUD has already required that in addition
to ghetto sites, site packages should also include locations in white
neighborhoods. The relevant HUD handbook recites:
The aim of a Local Authority in carrying out its responsibility
for site selection should be to select from among sites which are
acceptable under the other criteria of this Section those which will
afford the greatest opportunity for inclusion of eligible applicants
of all groups regardless of race, color, creed, or national origin,
thereby affording members of minority groups an opportunity to
locate outside of areas of concentration of their own minority
group. Any proposal to locate housing only in areas of racial con-
centration will be prima facie unacceptable and will be returned
to the Local Authority for further consideration and submission
of either (1) alternative or additional sites in other areas so as to
provide more balanced distribution of the proposed housing or
must provide relocation assistance when private discrimination makes relocation more
difficult, then the question is one of legitimacy. See Arrington v. City of Fairfield, 414
F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1969).
43. CHA was able to include the statement of jurisdiction outside the City of Chicago,
see note 18 supra, and a compromise as to the number of white sites initially to be
required. Kula Interview.
44. Telephone interview with Alexander Polikoff, Attorney for Plalintiffs, Nov. 24, 1969,
45. The word regulations is used loosely. Apparently the HUD Low Rent Housing
Manual, the relevant parts being contained in the Low Rent Pre-Construction Handboof
since June, 1969, does not partake of the status of those regulations found in CFR,
rather being more on the order of "guidelines." Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321
(6th Cir. 1969).
46. For the interaction of courts and agencies in a similar context, see generally,
Note, The Courts, HEW and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YAtX L.J. 321 (1907),
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, affirmed en bane
380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. den. sub. nom. Caldo Parish School Board v. United
States, 389 US. 840 (1967).
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(2) a clear showing, factually substantiated, that no acceptable
sites are available outside the areas of racial concentration.
47
Where HUD's policy resolution and that of the Gautreaux judgment
order differ, however, is in the order's practical effect of eliminating
ghetto development.4s HUD policy has rather maintained that both in-
tegration and community development serve desirable ends and that
the implementation of one strategy need not affect the implementation
of the others. In fact, even the source taking a position in other re-
spects closest to that of the Judgment Order,40 The Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, requires that
enrichment must be an important adjunct to any integration
course. No matter how ambitious or energetic such a program may
be, few Negroes living in the central city ghettos would be quickly
integrated. In the meantime, significant improvement in their
present environment is essential.0
It is difficult to imagine a justification for the judgment order's sole
and complete reliance on the integration ethic to the exclusion of
ghetto development.
One possibility open to the court here would have been, after an
47. Low Rent Housing Pre-Construction Handbook, Chap. 1, § 1, at 8. See also Local
Public Agency Letter #318, Supplements 2 & 3 of Feb. 21, 1968, as reported in 3 CCH
URBw AFr. s Rp 17,560, setting as a prerequisite for federal financial assistance
for public planning, indication of how the proposed projects meet the goal of reducing
residential concentration of minority groups within the community.
Note, however, the introduction by Rep. Widnall of H.R. 10053, 91st Cong., 1st Sems.
(1969), to amend the Housing Act of 1937 to prevent HUD from requiring a particular
balance of distribution of low-rent housing within a community where that requirement
would act to slow the provision of housing.
In addition, scattered site projects are recommended to prevent high concentration of
low income tenants, Low Rent Housing Pre-Construction Handbook, Chap. 1,§ 1, at 6,
and the judgment order's three story requirement turns out to be statutory. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1415(11).
48. Pp. 720-22 supra.
49. See note 15 supra.
50. REPORT OF rm NAMIONAL ADVisoRy Co. tsl soN Ox Cni. Diso . s 406 (1963) (em-
phasis added). See also, H. Wolnan, How is Federal Housing Policy Made?. 26 JouVAsL or
HosNG 189 (1969). Wolman did a survey of "government influentials" and asked whether
"Public policy should be directed towards (a) improving housing conditions within the
ghetto; (b) dispersing the ghetto; or (c) both in about equal proportions." Since the
methods of sample selection were not indicated, his results, set out below, should be taken
with a grain of salt.
PUBLIC POLIcY TowARD GuETTos
Public Policy Influentials
Improve the Ghetto 19
Disperse the Ghetto 9
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indication of the number of unit reservations allocated to Chicago by
HUD, an order to build X number of units in white neighborhoods.
The benefit of such an approach is to remove the unnecessary inflex-
ibility of the tie to black housing while still providing the required
choice to ghetto residents. Following compliance with that order, I-IUD
and CHA would remain free to assign future commitments on the
basis of their own good-faith policy decisions, rather than the court's,
as to the relative priority of various needs. 1
This is not to say, however, that the court's proper role is one of
complete deference to HUD. The plaintiffs before the court have the
right to more than just a policy decision; they have the right to an en-
forced policy decision. In a case like this, the court has the capacity
to enforce its own judgment order, a fact of particular importance
because HUD has all but refused to enforce its own policy decision52
Of course, in all situations the required policy decision may not
already have been made. Yet here as well the court has a distinctive
role to play in forcing the relevant agency to make the necessary deter-
mination-again, a role tailored to its capacity. In the Gaztreaux case,
HUD could have been forced to participate more actively. I-IUD had
been made a defendant in a companion suit,63 but that suit was stayed
pending disposition of the action against CHA. Thus in the remedy
hearings HUD was allowed to remain the reluctant contributor of a
single, vaguely worded comment on the plaintiffs' proposed order. Had
the two suits been consolidated, 4 the remedy hearings would have in-
cluded HUD as an active participant.50
51. There is one method of salvage, however, still open to the court. The order in
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority applies only to public housing in which, In one
way or another, CHA is a party. More recent programs, 221(d)(3), 235, 286, bypass the
local authority and, involving relations only between the private developer and HUD,
are not covered by the judgment order. Thus, one issue the court should be considering
on the pending motion for summary judgment in the companion case against HUD,
Gautreaux v. Romney, No. 66 C 1460, is that by refusing to extend plaintiffs the similar
relief against HUD they seek, the court leaves HUD open to provide, through Its direct
programs, the necessary ghetto development the original order unjustifiably prevents.
52. The complaints in both Gautreaux and Hicks v. Weaver were rejected by IIUD.
The Gautreaux complaint and HUD's rejection of it are attached as appendices to Reply
Brief for Defendant, Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 ?. Supp. 907 (N.D.
Ill. 1969).
53. Gautreaux v. Romney, No. 66 C 1460 (N.D. Ill.), stayed pending disposition of
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, June 19, 1967; motion for summary judgment
filed, Oct. 81, 1969.
54. As was apparently done by Judge Heebe in Hicks v. Weaver, 802 F. Supp. 619
(E.D. La. 1969).
55. Further, in a consolidated suit, should the court anticipate that a judgment would
not be handed down against HUD and that, therefore, HUD would not be present at the
remedy hearing, the court could have required the issue of relief to be briefed on the
cross-motions for summary judgment. Compare United States v. Grinnell Corp., 848 US,
563, 580-83 (1966) (approval of lower court pre.trial on relief).
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The point of this discussion has been to suggest that the judgment
order in Gautreaux represents very poor policy, and also to suggest why
that was so. The traditional role of the courts is, given the changing
nature of the society they serve, placing the courts in a position of being
called upon to make exceedingly nontraditional decisions. Citations to
instances of courts handling exceedingly complex bankruptcy or re-
organization cases does not change the fact that our courts remain
technically incapable of adequately solving the urban ills of our nation
on their own. It is only by explicitly recognizing such incapacity and
equally recognizing that its role in that policy process is not to resolve
policy issues themselves, but to force their resolution by those com-
petent to make them, that courts can participate creatively in the re-
building of the cities.
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